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CHAPTER II

CLAIMS CONCERNING LAWFUL COMBATANTS
The most general claim concerning combatants in naval warfare is that
it is lawful to use all efficient vessels, aircraft, and personnel against the
enemy. As stated in Chapter I, submarines have been the subject of claims
and counterclaims concerning their combatant status. If -the claim to deny
submarines lawful combatant status or to "abolish" them were successful,
it would deprive the submarine officers and crew of status as lawful combatants. A related claim is that the submarine must be "limited" by law in
some way.

A. WARSHIPS AS LAWFUL COMBATANTS
It is well known that not everyone may lawfully participate in combat
during war or hostilities. Both public authorization and public control
have been traditionally required in order to confer the status of lawful
combatants. 1 Thus, soldiers, sailors, and airmen who are members of the
public armed forces are typical lawful combatants. 2 They are authorized
by their government to commit acts of regulated and controlled coercion
and violence. "Lawful combatants" is used to refer to those indviduals
who, if captured by the enemy, must be accorded all the rights provided
by international law for prisoners of war. "Unlawful combatants," in
contrast, is used to refer to those individuals who, upon capture, are
subject to punishment if they lack public authorization and control.
In land hostilities the individual is regarded as the basic unit of military
force and, consequently, it is important that he be identified indvidually
as having combatant status. 3 In sea and air hostilities the individual combatant is usually associated with a combatant unit such as a warship or
1
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military aircraft. 4 A warship or military aircraft is a lawful combatant
unit since its personnel comply with the dual juridical requirements of
public authorization and public control.
Where they are separated from their vessel or aircraft, as in a shipwreck
or forced landing situation, naval officers and crewmen retain their status
as lawful combatants. In the same way, such officers and sailors who
conduct hostilities apart from warships and naval aircraft, such as the
U.S. Navy's underwater demolition teams composed of swimmers/ are
lawful combatants. There can be no doubt concerning the lawful combatant status in such a situation but, as a practical matter it may be particularly desirable for such combatants to carry military identification tags or
to wear uniforms in order to facilitate their identification. If questions
are raised concerning lawful combatant status, reasonable doubts in establishing identification should be resolved in favor of those claiming such
status.
The necessity for according prisoner of war status to all lawful combatants is illustrated by the Trial of Schoengrath 6 before a British Military
Court in Germany in 1946. In this case the defendants, seven members
of the Nazi SS, were charged with committing a war crime "in the killing
of an unknown Allied airman, a prisoner of war." 7 The facts concerned
an airman who had descended by parachute from his bomber aircraft
which had been flying westward over occupied Holland. The defendants,
apparently acting on the assumption that he was an Allied airman, shot
him shortly after his capture rather than accord him status as a prisoner
of war. The defense contended that there was no case to answer because
the prosecution had produced no evidence to show that the victim was
in fact an Allied airman. 8 The prosecution replied that it was too farfetched to assume that the bomber aircraft involved, in view of the facts,
was a neutral aircraft. 9 The court convicted the defendants as charged
even though the nationality of the airman was not proved. The decision
is sound because the airman was entitled to prisoner of war status in the
light of the facts which were shown. Even if he had been a neutral national
serving in the air force of an Allied state, he would have been a lawful
combatant.
Where an individual is entitled to status as a prisoner of war, he must
not be subjected to discriminatory treatment. This doctrine is prescribed
• Such combatant units typically display the national flag or emblem as an identify~
ing mark.
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in appropriately broad terms in the Geneva Convention, Relative to the
Treatlnent of Prisoners of War ( 1949) :
Taking into consideration the provisions of the present Convention
relating to rank and sex, and subject to any privileged treatment
which may be accorded to them by reason of their state of health,
age or professional qualifications, all prisoners of war shall be treated
alike by the Detaining Power, without any adverse distinction based
on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any other
distinction founded on similar criteria. 10
Since the submarine warship is subject to the same public authorization
and control as any other warship, it appears to qualify as a lawful combatant unit. If a submarine is a lawful combatant, its personnel are entitled
to prisoner of war status if they are captured. Claims to abolish or limit
submarines are based upon the implicit premise of their existing lawful
combatant status.

B. CLAIMS TO "ABOLISH" OR LIMIT SUBMARINES AS COMBATANTS
1. The Hague Peace Conferences
The primary work of the Hague Conferences was the legal regulation
of warfare rather than the establishment of peace.

a. THE 1899 CONFERENCE
The Russian Emperor issued the first invitation for the 1899 Conference with stated objectives which included ending "these incessant
armaments." 11 Apparently the negative reaction of the powers required
the second invitation which relegated disarmament, except that concerning submarines, to a secondary role. 12 The motivation for the Conference
has been ascribed to the humanitarian personal characteristics of the
Czar. 13 It probably was at least partly due to the superiority of other states
over Russia in military and naval technology and armament. It was cautiously proposed in the first article of the second invitation that consideration be given to not increasing existing military forces and to making
"a preliminary examination of the means by which a reduction might even
be effected in the forces and Budgets [sic J above mentioned." 14 Other
subjects proposed as the second and third articles respectively were the
limitation of guns and explosives to prohibit any more powerful than those
10
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then in use. 15 "The subjects to be submitted for international disucussion
at the Conference" included, as the fourth article, the proposal
To prohibit the use, in naval warfare, of submarine torpedo boats
or plungers, or other similar engines of destruction . . . . 16
The proposal was at a time when no new major war appeared to threaten
the peace of the world and when the submarine or "plunger" was a
relatively new and untried vessel.
Secretary of State Hay instructed the United States delegation on these
points in no uncertain terms:
The second, third, and fourth articles, relating to the non-employment of firearms, explosives, and other destructive agents, the restricted
use of existing instruments of destruction, and the prohibition of
certain contrivances employed in naval warfare, seem lacking in
practicability, and the discussion of these propositions would probably prove provocative of divergence rather than unanimity of views.
It is doubtful if wars are to be diminished by rendering them less
destructive, for it is the plain lesson of history that the periods of
peace have been longer protracted as the cost and destructiveness
of war have increased. The expediency of restraining the inventive
genius of our people in the direction of devising means of defense
is by no means clear, and, considering the temptations to which men
and nations may be exposed in a time of conflict, it is doubtful if an
international agreement to this end would prove effective. The dissent
of a single powerful nation might render it altogther nugatory. The
.d elegates are, therefore, enjoined not to give the weight of their
influence to the promotion of projects the realization of which is
so uncertain. 17
The combined instructions and rationale just quoted fixed the position
of the United States delegation. The views of the various delegations on
the Russian proposal to ban submarines were expressed on May 31, 1899. 18
The German delegate, representing a state engaged in the construction
of a great surface navy, favored interdiction conditioned upon unanimity.
The Japanese and Italian delegates stated their opinions as being similar
to the German. The British delegate, representing the preeminent naval
power, favored prohibition providing only that the Great Powers agreed.
The lesser naval powers could be expected to take a different view. The
delegate of Austria-Hungary represented a state which possessed no sub-:
mannes but in the personal view of the delegate they "may be used for
15
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the defense of ports and roadsteads and render very important services."
The delegate of France, representing a country with a navy and a building
program inferior to that of Great Britain or Germany, stated his country's
position "that the submarine torpedo [boat] has an eminently defensive
purpose, and that the right to use it should therefore not be taken from
a country." The Netherlands delegate characterized the submarine as "the
weapon of the weak" 19 and so not subject to prohibition. The delegate of
Sweden-Norway concurred with the Netherlands views. The Turkish
delegate wished to reserve the defensive use of submarines. The delegate
of Siam wished to refer the matter to his Governn1ent since he had general
instructions to favor humanitarian interests but believed that "the necessities of defense of the small nations must be taken into serious consideration." The Danish delegate, perhaps surprisingly, thought that his
Government, to which he referred the qu_estion, would favor prohibition
conditioned upon unanimity. The attitude of Russia was not in doubt but
its desire for pr~hibition was also conditioned on unanimity. The dominant
view of the smaller naval powers was that submarines constituted a cheap
means of defense and so could not be prohibited.
Three weeks later the question of prohibiting submarines was put to a
vote in plenary meeting. The voting was recorded as follows: 20
For prohibition with reservation (of unspecified character) : Belgium,
Greece, Persia, Siam, and Bulgaria (five states) .
For prohibition with reservation of unanimity: Germany, Italy, Great
Britain, Japan, and Roumania (five states) .
Against prohibition: United States, Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Spain,
France, Portugal, Sweden-Norway, Netherlands, and Turkey (nine states).
Abstaining: Russia, Serbia, and Switzerland (three states).
Thus the first attempt to make the submarine an unlawful combatant
ended in failure.

b. THE 1907 CONFERENCE
During the Russo-Japanese War, President Theodore Roosevelt
took the initiative in calling the Conference of 1907 21 and, after the Peace
Treaty of Portsmouth ending that war, the President allowed the Czar
to become the nominal initiator as a matter of diplomatic courtesy. 22 By
1907 most of the major navies contained submarines and neither the
19
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diplomatic correspondence issued by the President nor that issued by the
Czar suggested their abolition.
The Russo-Japanese War demonstrated the serious apprehensions of the
Russian Navy concerning submarines. On April 13, 1904 two first-class
Russian battleships struck Japanese mines off Port Arthur and one sank
while the other was severely damaged. This event has been described
as follows:
[The] disaster seems to have caused something approaching a panic
in the Russian fleet. Ships began to fire wildly at the water round
them, apparently under the impression that they were being attacked
by submarine boats .... 23
The 1907 Conference recognized by necessary implication the lawful
co:rpbatant status of surface torpedo boats, surface torpedo boat destroyers,
and also submarines. It did this by regulating their principal weapon,
the self-propelled torpedo. Hague Convention VIII provided that torpedoes must be so constructed that those which miss their mark then become
harmless. 24 Of course, where the target was missed the primary military
value of the self-propelled torpedo was eliminated and the regulation only
prevented its use as a floating mine. And so the stage was laid for the
submarine to be used in World War I.

2. The First World War
a. THE

PUNITIVE TREATMENT
SONNEL

OF

CAPTURED

PER-

In the early part of World War I, during the incumbency of
Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, the British Government
adopted a system of punitive treatment for certain German prisoners of
war in its hands. The prisoners of war involved consisted of thirty-nine
officers and men who comprised the surviving crew members of two German submarines. 25 All of these submarine prisoners were segregated in
naval detention barracks and some of them were held there in solitary
confinement. The German Government promptly retaliated by placing an
equal number of British Army officers in solitary confinement. Thereafter,
the British Government changed its policy and treated captured German
submarine personnel in the same way as other prisoners of war. The British
claim to accord punitive treatment to German submarine personnel was
in substance a claim that German submarines were unlawful combatants
23

1 British Committee of Imperial Defense, Official History (Naval and Military)
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and that their personnel, upon capture, were not entitled to nondiscriminatory treatment as prisoners of war. 26
The case of Captain Fryatt, which also arose in the early part of the
First World War, concerns the related issue of the status of merchant ship
personnel. 27 Captain Fryatt of the British unarmed merchant ship Brussels
refused to surrender to a German submarine and attempted, without success, _to ram the submarine as it approached his ship. Subsequently he was
captured and the German Govemmen t declined to accord him prisoner
of war status. Following a court-martial he was execu ted on the charge of
having committed "a franc-tireur crime against the sea forces of Germany." 28 The official German statement announcing the execution stated
that Fryatt was "not a member of a combatant force" and that he had
been condemned to death because of his attempted attack upon a German
submarine. 29 Thus the German claim rested , upon the simple premise that
Captain Fryatt was an unlawful combatant who violated the laws of war
by his attempted attack. Professor Gamer describes the execution as a
"plain act of judicial murder." 30

b. THE PARTIAL "ABOLITION" OF SUBMAR INES
During the First World War any doubts as to the efficiency of submarine naval vessels were removed. It is well known that Germany used
submarines to bring Great Britain to the brink of defeat. The United
States claimed that the German methods of submarine warfare were
illegal but did not claim that the submarine was an unlawful combatant
unit. 31
Following the war, the Central Powers' submarines existing or in process
of construction were transferred to the Allies or broken up. 32 Submarines
were abolished for Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey by
prohibiting each of them to acquire submarines through an article employing the following uniform language which appeared in each peace treaty
with the five states just named:
26
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The construction or acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial
33
purposes, shall be forbidden in
Thus partial abolition was obtained as one of the fruits of victory.

3. Naval Disarmament and Limitation Between the World Wars

a. THE

WASHINGTON

CONFERENCE

(1921-1922)

An observer has stated that the United States was the only state
in a position to call a conference on the limitation of armament following
World War !. 34 The United States was building the largest navy in the
world and was not a member of the League of Nations, which organization
was therefore precluded from effective action. 35 The United States position appeared to be that it could achieve agreement on the limitation of
naval armament by giving up its great building program. 36
In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, the
two principal European naval powers, France and Italy, were participants.
( 1) The Washington Naval Treaty ( 1922)

The United States naval disarmament proposals presented by
Secretary of State Hughes were comprehensive and specific. 37 They were
based on four stated "general principles": 3 8 ( 1) the elimination of actual
and projected capital shipbuilding. programs; (2) additional reduction by
scrapping of certain older capital ships; (3) regard for "existing naval
strength"; ( 4) the existing capital ship tonnage as the basis for proportionate. allowance of tonnage for other combatant vessels. It was specifically
proposed that the United States and Great Britain would each be allowed
90,000 tons of submarines to 54,000 tons for Japan. 39 But before the question of limitation of submarines was considered, Great Britain, through
Lord Lee, the First Lord of the Admiralty, proposed their abolition to
the Committee on Limitation of Armament.
(a)

ABOLITION

On December 22, 1921 Lord Lee presented an indictment of
33
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the submarine. 40 The French view of the need for a large new French
submarine fleet had already alarmed the British. In demanding the "total
and final abolition" of the submarine, Lord Lee attempted to make it
perfectly clear that the British had "no unworthy or selfish motives." 41 On
the contrary, they were fighting the battle not only of the allied and
associated powers but of the entire civilized world. 42 He explained that
the history of the recent war had demonstrated in convincing fashion that
submarines constituted neither effective nor economical defense for the
smaller powers. 43 During the World War, Germany had employed 375
submarines and 203 of these had been sunk. He pointed out that millions
of British and American troops had been transported across the water
without the loss of a single man excepting those on hospital ships. The
submarine, in the British view, was effective only against merchant shipping. During the war over 12 million tons ~f such shipping had been sunk
along with the killing of 20,000 noncombatant men, women, and children.
Before the end' of his speech, Lord . Lee admitted that antisubmarine
warfare was a very expensive matter indeed. During the war the United
Kingdom had maintained "an average of no less than 3,000 anti-submarine
surface craft" in order to deal with no more than nine or ten German
submarines operating at one time on the Atlantic approaches to France
and Great Britain. 44
A sense of realism concerning Lord Lee's recommendation can best be
conveyed by direct quotations from it:
It was a weapon of murder and piracy, involving the drowning of
noncombatants. It had been used to sink passenger ships, cargo ships,
and even hospital ships. Technically the submarine was so constructed
that it could not be utilized to rescue even women and children from
sinking ships. That was why he hoped that the conference would not
give it a new lease of life. 45

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

The submarine was the only class of vessel for which the conference
was asked to give-he would not say a license, but permission to thrive
and multiply. It would be a great disappointment if the British Empire
delegation failed to persuade the conference to get rid of this weapon,
which involved so much evil to peoples who live on or by the sea.
To show the earnestness of the British Government in this matter,
Lord Lee pointed out that Great Britain possessed the largest and
40
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probably the most efficient submarine navy in the world, composed of
100 vessels of 80,000 tons. She was prepared to scrap the whole of
this great fleet, to disband the personnel, provided the other powers
would do th e same. That was the British offer to the world, and he
believed it was a greater contribution to the cause of humanity than
even the limitation of capital ships. 46
The French, Italian, and Japanese delegations then joined with the
British in deploring the illegal and inhumane use of submarines by Germany during the World W ar. 47 But each of them indicated that submarines
were regarded as useful for defense and expresssed the conviction that
submarines cou ld be u sed consistent with the law. 48
Secretary Hughes then placed the United States on record as opposed
to abolition by reading the report on submarines which had been prepared
by the Advisory Committee of the American delegation. The report joined
in condemning illega l uses of the submarine and considered uses regarded
as legal in some detail. 49 I t a lso stated :
The United States would never desire its Navy to undertake unlimited submarine warfa re. In fact, the spirit of fair play of the people
would bring about the downfall of the administration which attempted
to sanction its use. 50
On December 23, 1921 Adm iral de Bon made formal reply to Lord Lee
for the French Governmen t. 51 He first emphasized the military efficiency
and uses of submarines and referred to a number of examples drawn
from the World War. His secon d and main point concerned the efficiency
of the submarine against merchant vessels. It started with the usual denunciation of German methods and went on to claim the efficiency of the
submarine even without the use of such methods.
Certainly the fruits of submarine warfare \Vould have been smaller
if they had been obliged to confiine themselves to the limits of honorable warfare, but it is impossible to claim that there would have
been none. 52

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Our opinion is that it is especially the weapon of nations not having
a large navy. It is, in fact, a comparatively cheap element in naval
warfare which can be procured in large numbers at a cost far below
that of capital ships. 53
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In conclusion, Admiral de Bon stated the French position u nequivocally:
"I believe that 90,000 tons is the absolute minimum for all the navies who
may want to have a submarine force." 54 This was supported by saying that
it would only mean ninety vessels of modern type of which, becau se of
maintenance and repair requirements, only fifteen or twenty would be capable of simultaneous action. 55
Mr. Balfour then made two replies to the French arguments. 56 In his
second statement he pointed out that France had prevented any consideration of reduction of land armaments because of its need to maintain a
great army against possible German military resurgence. 57 Now it was
stated that France must also maintain a tremendous submarine fleet. He
asked as to the value of a French submarine fleet if the German submarine
fleet were rebuilt. In the British view, such a French submarine fleet would
be of no value and, futher, France would have to look to British Navy
antisubmarine forces for protection as it had done before. 5 8
Secretary Hughe,s, as chairman, then formally recognized that it was not
possible to reach agreement on abolition. 59 After complimentary references
to the substance and spirit of the British proposal, he expressed the hope
that the discussions on the subject would lead to a denunciation of illegal
methods of submarine warfare and an undertaking by the five powers to
assure the application of the principles of international law to such warfare.60 In the chairman's view, limitation should be considered unless
further discussion of abolition was desired. 61 Mr. Balfour took the opportunity to place a brief summary of the British position in the record.
The British Empire delegation desired formally to place on record
its opinion that the use of submarines, whilst of small value for defensive purposes, leads inevitably to acts which are inconsistent with the
laws of war and the dictates of humanity, and the delegation desires
that united action should be taken by all nations to forbid their maintenance, construction, or employment. 62
Dr. Royse has summarized the outcome of the "submarine debates":
Utilitarianism appeared at the Washington Conference of 1921-22
as a dominating motive in the submarine debates. The same attitude
was taken toward the submarine, by most of the Powers present, as
54
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that taken by the United States Government during the late [First
World] war, that the submarine was not an illegitimate weapon in
itself. 63
(b) LIMITATION
Chairman Hughes then turned to the limitation of submarines
by making a concrete revised proposal on this subject. In lieu of the 90,000
tons of submarines first proposed for the United States and Great Britain,
he now proposed 60,000 tons maximum for each. The remaining three
powers would maintain the status quo and he understood this to be 31,452
tons for Japan, 31,391 tons for France, and about 21,000 tons for Italy. 64
When the meeting reconvened on December 24 the British delegation
accepted the chairman's proposal. 65 Admiral de Bon referred to the French
conception of ninety vessels as a minimum submarine fleet and said that
the proposal was so far below this that it "was equivalent to abolishing
the whole French program." 66 Consequently, the French delegation could
not accept the proposals and must ask instructions of its Government. 67
Italy and Japan also rejected the United States proposals. Italy was willing, however, to accept a maximum of 31,500 tons on condition of parity
with France. 68 Japan insisted on the original United States proposal of
54,000 tons in spite of the substantial reductions already accepted by the
United States and Great Britain. 69
Four days later Mr. Sarraut presented the considered views of the
French Government. After referring to the French acceptance of inferior
strength in capital ships, he stated that 90,000 tons for submarines constituted the minimum consistent with his country's vital interests. 70 Thus
ended the attempt to restrict the total tonnages of submarine fleets. Chairman Hughes admitted his disappointment concerning the French position
on submarines. 71 Mr. Balfour went further and said that the 90,000 tons
of submarines were intended to destroy commerce. 72 In addition, the great
submarine fleet to be built on the shores closest to Great Britain would
necessarily be a menace to her. 73 Mr. Sarraut indignantly rejected the
criticisms. 74 Mr. Balfour then attempted further explanation of the reasons
63
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why submarines were a threat to Britain. 75 The records of the Conference
do not reveal French sympathy for what was regarded as a British problem.
In addition to the failure to limit the size of submarine forces, the
ratified Treaty on Limitation of Naval Armament 76 between the five
naval powers states no limitation on the size or armament of individual
submarines. This lack of restriction together with the provision in the
Treaty permitting the stiffening of merchant ships' decks in time of peace
to facilitate arming them in wartime 77 indicated the probability that
both submarines and armed merchant ships would be used in the next
general war. It was probable that aircraft would be used also. The discussions showed no interest in the "abolition" of military aircraft. Mr.
Balfour, for example, stated:
Unlike the case of submarines, in the case of aircraft military and
civilian uses were not sharply divided. T:Qere was practically no commercial civil use for a submarine, but there were many who thought
that the development of aerial invention was going to exert an immense influence upon the economic development of mankind and
upon intercommunication of different peoples. In the present stage
of their knowledge of air matters it seemed quite impossible to limit
aircraft designed for commercial uses .... 78

( 2) The Submarine Treaty ( 1922): Submarine Personnel as
Pirates
After it became clear that there would be neither abolition nor
limitation, as such, of submarines, Mr. Root, a distinguished former Secretary of State of the United States, proposed certain resolutions concerning the rules of submarine warfare. In his view, the resolutions should
be clear and simple. 79 They were characterized by their terms as "the
prohibition of the use of submarines in warfare" 80 but actually only prohibited their use against merchant ships.
In the ensuing discussion, Senator Schanzer, the head of the Italian
delegation, thought it would be desirable to provide a definition of "merchant craft." 81 Mr. Root replied that, "Throughout all the long history
of international law no term had been better understood than the term
75
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'a merchant ship'." 82 Further, the term "could not be made clearer by
the addition of definitions which would only serve to weaken and confuse
it." 83 Senator Schanzer later concluded for his delegation that the term
"merchant vessel" as employed in the resolution was understood to refer
to "unarmed merchant vessels." 84
The resolutions were subject to some change before they were written
into A Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases
in Warfare. Article I of the proposed treaty laid down certain rules of
law, stated to be "an established part of international law," 85 concerning
visit, search, and seizure of merchant vessels as well as attacks upon them.
Article I further provided :
Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt
from the universal rules above stated; and if a submarine cannot
capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules the existing
law of nations requires it to desist from attack and from seizure and
to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested. 86
Article III provided:
The Signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the
humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks
upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person in the service of any Power who shall violate
any of those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a
governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of
war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of
piracy and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found. 87
As indicated by the excerpt quoted from article I, as well as by the
negotiating history and the title of the treaty, the submarine was the
principal subject. Article III had been broadened beyond submarine
personnel but, in the light of the experience in the First W?rld War,
submarine personnel were the principal concern.
In substance the Root resolutions were an attempt to do indirectly
what the Conference had declined to do directly, that is, make submarines
and their personnel unlawful combatants. The attempt, however, was only
successful in placing conditions upon the combatant status of submarines.
When the specified rules concerning action against merchant ships are
violated, the status of the submarine's personnel is assimilated to that of
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unlawful combatants or pirates. The Root resolutions, including this provision, received unanimous assent in the Conference. 88 Thereafter, the
French Government declined to ratify the Submarine Treaty and, consequently, submarines and their personnel remained lawful combatants
unconditionally. In summary, the submarine came out of the Washington
Conference with undiminished status as a lawful combatant. 89

b. THE GENEVA NAVAL CONFERENCE (1927)
For present purposes this Conference is important because the
United States changed its position concerning the necessity for submarines
which it had advanced at the Washington Conference and now favored
their abolition. In instructing the United States delegation to the Conference, President Coolidge st~ted orally the difficulty of a three-power
conference abolishing submarines but indicated that we should express
our willingness to abolish. 90 The British were consistent in favoring abolition and the Japanese were consistent in favoring retention. 91
The 1927 Conference may be described briefly as a failure. France and
Italy refused to attend and Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States accomplished little or nothing by attending. The United Kingdom
and the United States became involved in fruitless controversy concerning
the numbers and types of cruisers. 92

c. THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY (1930)
The failure of the 1927 Conference was doubtless one of the causes
of the London Conference of 1930.
( 1)

ABOLITION

The British invitation to Japan, France, and Italy was shown
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to the United States in advance and apparently approved by it. 93 It con- ,
tained the following significant paragraph:
Since both the Government of the United States and His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom adhere to the attitude that they
have publicly adopted in regard to the desirability of securing the
total abolition of the submarine, this matter hardly gave rise to discussion during the recent conversations. They recognize, however,
that no final settlement on this subject can be reached except in
conference with the other naval Powers. 94
The proposal for abolition was made by Mr. Alexander, the First Lord
of the British Admiralty. 95 His summary of the proposal contained five
major points:
( 1) In the general interests of humanity.
( 2) In consideration of our view that these vessels are primarily
offensive instruments.
( 3) In order to secure a most substantial contribution to disarmament
and peace.
(4) In view of the very important financial relief to be obtained.
( 5) In consideration of the conditions of service of the personnel and
the undue risks which can be abolished. 96
Mr. Alexander dealt with the humanity point briefly and referred to
"the feelings of horror which the peoples had experienced as results of
submarine action" 97 in the First World War. He referred to a number of
uses of the submarine which were deemed to be offensive including the
German war against commerce. 98 In connection with the economy point
( 4), he emphasized the indirect savings from the abolition of submarines
which would be realized in destroyers and antisubmarine forces generally.99 The last point ( 5) opened up a new subject. It was explained that
working conditions in submarines were cramped and the sailors suffered
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from poor air when submerged. This was not in keeping with the improved
standards urged generally for industrial workers. 100 In addition, peacetime
submarine accidents presented a grim peril. He pointed out that since 1918
there had been twelve major disasters in the submarine forces of the five
Powers represented at London with a loss of at least 570 men. 101 Such
losses, in the British view, could not be prevented by lifesaving equipment.
Secretary of State Stimson, the chairman of the United States delegation, - supported abolition in a short speech with the following central
paragraph:
The essential objection to the submarine is that it is a weapon
particularly susceptible to abuse; that it is susceptible of use against
merchant ships in a way which violates alike the old and well-established laws of war and the dictates of humanity. The use made of the
submarine revolted the conscience of the world, and the threat of its
unrestricted use against merchant ships was what finally determined
the entry of my own country into the conflict. In the light of our
experience it seems clear that in any future war those who employ
the submarine will be under strong temptation, perhaps irresistible
temptation, to use it in the way which is most effective for immediate
purposes, regardless of future consequences. These considerations convince us that technical arguments should be set aside in order that the
submarine may henceforth be abolished. 102
The only elaborate statement of opposition to abolition came from Mr.
Leygues, the French Minister of Marine. 103 In the French view, the submarine was to be regarded as any other warship and it was sometimes
more efficient than other warships and sometimes less so. 104 The World
War had proven the effectiveness of submarines against surface warships.
Must it disappear because it disturbs the habits and the honored
traditions of surface ships? It may happen to-morrow [sic] that every
type of warship in the various navies will belong to the submarine
class. 105
In the French view, the submarine was deemed the defensive weapon of
the smaller navies. 106 It would supplement the comparative weakness of
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the French surface fleet and provide scouts for it. It would maintain lines
of communication between France and its overseas territories. In addition,
alleged barbarity is to be ascribed to particular users of the submarine and
not to the vessel itsel£. 107 The development of the submarine was regarded
as making it more capable of conforming to the rules applicable to surface ships. 108 The French Government believed that unrestricted submarine
warfare against commerce should be outlawed/ 09 but France could not
accept abolition of the submarine. 110
The Italian Foreign Minister stated that the abolition of submarines
would favor the more powerful navies. 111 Italy, however, did not object
to abolition, in principle, provided that all the naval powers concurred
and that it would bring about a drastic reduction of other armaments. 112
For the Japanese delegation, Admiral Takarabe argued for the retention
of submarines because of Japan's geographical situation:
Japan, consisting, as she does, of so many islands scattered so widely
on the sea extending from the tropical to the frigid zones, sees in such
kind of arm a convenient and adequate means to provide for her
national defense. With this comparatively inexpensive war craft she
can contrive to look after her extensive waterways and vulnerable
points. Japan desires to retain submarines solely for this purpose. 113

(2) Limitation
Submarines were treated similarly to the other principal types
of warships by the Conference. Article 7 of the Treaty, applicable to all
five Powers, provided the general rule that each submarine was to be
limited to a maximum displacement of 2,000 tons with no gun above 5.1
inch caliber. 114 Three larger submarines with greater caliber guns were
permitted for each Power.115 Article 16, applicable only to the United
States, Great Britain, and Japan, limited the total submarines of each to
52,000 tons. 116 France and Italy did not accept limitations upon total
tonnage.
In summary, the limitations recognized the lawful combatant status of
submarines by implication. The failure of abolition, even though the United
Those attempts to arrive at a decision on the basis of its 'offensive' or 'defensive'
character resulted in nothing more than special pleading.
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States supported the consistent British position,117 recognized their lawful
combatant status more directly. Article 22 of the London Naval Treaty of
1930118 set forth rules regulating submarines and other warships in their
actions against merchant ships. Its subject, therefore, concerns the lawfulness of the objects and methods of belligerent attack and assumes lawful combatant status.

d. THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY (1936)
In the opening speech of the Conference, British Prime Minister
Baldwin mentioned that the British "still press for the abolition of the
submarine." 119 This consistent objective was supported by the United
States 120 and opposed by France. 121 In the technical subcommittee Vice
Admiral Robert of the French delegation stated that the question of the
abolition of the submarine "should be buried forever." 122 The result was
no further consideration of abolition during _the Conference.
A measure of qualitative limitation of submarines was achieved in the
Treaty. It was provided that future submarines were not to exceed 2,000
tons standard displacement or carry a gun in excess of 5.1 inches in caliber.123 Other warships were limited analogously.

4. The Spanish Civil War and the Second World War
a. THE NYON AGREEMENT (1937)

During the Spanish Civil War in 1937 attacks without warning
were made by unknown submarines against non-Spanish warships and
merchant ships. 124 The United Kingdom and France took the lead in
calling a special conference at N yon in order to condemn submarine attacks upon such ships and to provide sanctions to deter the attacks. 125
The ensuing nine-Power agreement provided:
Whereas arising out of the Spanish conflict attacks have been repeatedly committed in the Mediterranean by submarines against
7
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merchant ships not belonging to either of the conflicting Spanish
parties; and
Whereas these attacks are violations of the rules of international
law referred to in Part IV of the Treaty of London of April 22, 1930
with regard to the sinking of merchant ships and constitute acts contrary to the most elementary dictates of humanity, which should be
justly treated as acts of piracy . . .126
The remainder of the Agreement specified "certain special collective
measures against piratical attacks by submarines" including:
Any submarine which attacks such a [merchant] ship in a manner
contrary to the rules of international law referred to in the International Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments signed in London on April 22, 1930, and confirmed in the
Protocol signed in London on November 6, 1936 shall be counterattacked and, if possible, destroyed. 127
Article 22 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, the juridical basis for
the Nyon Agreement, provides certain rules for warships, both surface and
submarine, to observe with regard to merchant ships. As a general rule,
it is prescribed that such warships "may not sink or render incapable of
navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew,
and ship's papers in a place of safety." 12 8 Unlike the abortive Treaty
Concerning Submarines and Noxious Gases/ 29 the London Naval Treaty
makes no provision for assimilating naval personnel to pirates. The Nyon
Agreement, therefore, goes beyond the London Treaty in this respect. 130
The juridical result of the Nyon Agreement is to deprive the personnel
of the submarines concerned of status as lawful combatan~s when they
carry out the attacks proscribed in the Nyon Agreement and deemed to be
"piratical acts." The scholars have differed as to whether or not the Nyon
Agreement is a proper extension of the Ia~ of piracy. 131 The present
significance of the Agreement, although it was an ad hoc arrangement
for the Spanish Civil War, is that it was a high point in the international
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acceptance of the British juridical claim to make submarines and their
personnel unlawful combatants. 132

b. THE UNDECLARED ATLANTIC NAVAL WAR (1941)
On September 4, 1941 the United States destroyer Greer, en route
to Iceland, was the object of an unsuccessful torpedo attack by a submerged German submarine. 133 President Roosevelt stated that, "This was
piracy, legally and morally" 134 and "when you see a rattlesnake poised to
strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him." 135 The
President described the German attack as an aggression against "the freedom of the seas" 136 and stated that the United States would continue to
defend this freedom by ordering the U.S. Navy to attack German or I tali an
vessels which entered "waters the protection of which is necessary for
American defense ...." 13 7
The United States claim enunciated by President Roosevelt has been
described as a defense measure against piratical attacks which were contrary to internation(!.l law. 138 The use of the piracy terminology could be
construed as a claim to deprive the particular submarine personnel of
status as lawful combatants. In view of the context, including the lack of
a declared war, it is probably more plausible to interpret the President's
piracy wording as a part of a claim for the U.S. Navy to initiate attack in
appropriate circumstances. Professor Lauterpacht, however, has approved
the United States claim as a claim concerning piracy and stated:
There is substance in the view that, by continuous usage, the notion
132
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of piracy has been extended from its original meaning of predatory
acts committed on the high seas by private persons and that it now
covers generally ruthless acts of lawlessness on the high seas by whomsoever committed. 139

c. THE PARTIAL "ABOLITIONJJ OF SUBMARINES (1945)
During the Second World War submarines with increased efficiency
were employed by, inter alia, Germany, the United States, and the United
Kingdom. The principal claims and counterclaims relating to submarines
concerned other legal issues than combatant status.
At the close of World War II the remaining German and Japanese
submarines were destroyed or divided among the principal victorious
Allies. 140 In 1966 the German Federal Republic 141 had submarines but
apparently East Germany did not. In 1966 both Japan 142 and Italy 143
had submarines.

d. THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT
NUREMBERG (1946)
Admiral Donitz, who was one of the defendants in the trial before
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, had served first as head
of the German submarine arm and then as commander in chief of the
Navy. 144 The argument of his counsel to the Tribunal referred briefly to
the retention of an "effective weapon":
The prosecution will perhaps take the standpoint that, in lieu of
this [use of submarines inconsistent with article 22 of the London
Naval Treaty of 1930], submarine warfare against armed merchant
vessels should have been discontinued. In the last war the most terrible weapons of warfare were ruthlessly employed by both sides on
land and in the_air. In view of this experience the thesis can hardly
be upheld today that in naval warfare one of the parties waging war
should be expected to give up using an effective weapon after the
adversary has taken measures making the use of it impossible in its
previous form. 145
The Tribunal's Judgment applicable to Admiral Donitz did not respond
expressly to the quoted claim. It is clear, however, that the Tribunal regarded submarines as lawful combatants. Its analysis was limited to other
139
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legal issues than combatant status but these other issues could not have been
considered as they were except upon the implicit holding of the lawful
combatant status of submarines. 146 Apparently no question was raised
concerning the lawful combatant status of military aircraft and their
personnel. 147

C. SUBMARINES AS LAWFUL COMBATANTS
The rejection of the claims to abolish the submarine have confirmed
its lawful combatant status. In the same way the limitation of the submarine by international agreement where other types of warships were
subject to analogous restriction has also recognized the lawful combatant
status of submarines and their personnel. Even the attempt to make submarines conditional unlawful combatants, as where they fail to comply
with particular rules concerning action against merchant ships, has been
dropped.
Con1bat interactions between submarines and merchant ships characterized both World Wars. It is important, therefore, to examine briefly the
combatant status of merchant ships and their personnel. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 accord prisoner of war status and thus status as lawful
combatants to the personnel of belligerent merchant ships. 148 The Geneva
Sea Convention includes among those entitled to prisoner of war status:
Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the
merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the
conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any
other provisions of international law. 149
It is particularly significant that merchant seamen are accorded prisoner
of war status without regard to whether their ships are armed or not. In
the same way no qualification is made concerning the action of merchant
ships and, consequently, even Captain Fryatt, 150 who attempted to ram a
German submarine, would now be entitled to prisoner of war status. Thus,
the personnel of belligerent merchant ships are now entitled to prisoner of
war status like the personnel of belligerent submarines.
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1. General War
The submarine's status as lawful combatant has been retained because
of the national interests or supposed national interests of some of the
major naval powers and particularly of France. 151 These national interests
have included the use of the submarine as a militarily efficient warship
and, particularly, its use in general war. The United States and the United
Kingdom have upon occasion agreed to abolition of the submarine conditioned upon the agreement of other powers. The same two states, however,
later manifested their national interests by employing submarines in general
war.
In the contemporary era of nuclear armed and propelled submarines
there are no governmental proposals to abolish the submarine. 152 The
principal thrust of contemporary disarmament proposals is directed at
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. 153 These are the weapons which
comprise the principal military capability of fleet ballistic missile submarines. Effective nuclear disarmament would not, however, deprive submarines of lawful combatant status. Thus, for the foreseeable future,
submarine warships and their personnel will continue to have status as
lawful combatants.

2. Limited War
It is clear that submarine warships and their personnel have the same
de jure status as lawful combatants in limited war which they have in
general war. Nevertheless, the strategic and tactical uses of submarines as
a component of naval power may be expected to be considerably less in
limited wars than in general wars. Professor Halperin has stated: "Submarines have not been used extensively, if at all, in local wars . . .." 154
Apparently submarines were not used in the Korean War. The Soviet
Union, which was in effect fighting the war by proxy/ 55 did not directly
employ its submarines even though they could have constituted a major
threat to the seaborne logistic support of the United Nations command.
The United States, which also sought to limit the war in other ways, did
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not employ its submarines. 156 There is no indication that submarines have
been used in the war in Vietnam.
The result is that, although submarines are de jure entitled to combatant
status, they are not extensively employed in limited war. The nonuse, or
at the most the very restricted use, of submarines is one way of keeping a
war limited. 157 Where the submarine is used for the same general purposes
for which surface warships are used, as for gun bombardment of the shore,
there is no reason that such action should increase the intensiveness or
extensiveness of a limited war.
156
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